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Introduction
Since at least the early 1980s, computer industry marketing prac-
tices with respect to software, service, parts, and maintenance have
been subject to frequent challenge under the antitrust laws of the
United States.' Those challenges generally have alleged that restric-
tions on consumer freedom to select third party operating systems,
diagnostics, or repair services violate the Sherman and Clayton Act
prohibitions against tying arrangements and monopolization.2 While
some earlier cases such as Digidyne recognized economic realities and
studied market imperfections to determine whether particular prac-
tices should subject industry participants to antitrust liability,3 the ab-
sence of directly pertinent Supreme Court authority resulted in a
multitude of approaches by the courts of appeal and concomitant un-
certainty that affected the implementation of marketing practices in
the computer industry. As a result of the Supreme Court's 1992 deci-
sion in Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Services' and the issu-
ance of the draft U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) Antitrust
Guidelines for the Licensing and Acquisition of Intellectual Property
(DOJ Guidelines),5 the standards governing industry participants
have evolved sufficiently to permit some line-drawing between accept-
able practices and those that may prove more problematic.
Even with Kodak and the DOJ Guidelines, courts still reach dif-
fering conclusions about the permissibility of certain marketing prac-
tices. In Data General Corp. v. Grumman System Support Corp.
(Grumman 1),6 a copyright infringement and trade secrets misappro-
priation case, the First Circuit affirmed a summary judgment order
against defendant Grumman on its tying arrangement and monopoli-
zation counterclaims. Those claims attacked Data General's asserted
policy to make available its copyrighted diagnostic software only to
hardware purchasers that purchased computer repair and mainte-
1. See, e.g., Digidyne Corp. v. Data Gen. Corp., 734 F.2d 1336 (9th Cir. 1984) (revers-
ing judgment notwithstanding the verdict and holding that Data General's refusal to li-
cense its operating system software except to purchasers of its central processing units
(computer hardware) constituted a tying arrangement in violation of the Sherman Act § 1,
15 U.S.C. § 1 (Supp. V 1988), and Clayton Act § 3, 15 U.S.C. § 14 (1988)), cert. denied, 473
U.S. 908 (1985); California Computer Prods. v. International Business Machs. Corp., 613
F.2d 727 (9th Cir. 1979) (CalComp) (affirming directed verdict in favor of computer manu-
facturer as to plaintiff's monopolization claims under the Sherman Act § 2, 15 U.S.C. § 2
(1988)).
2. See Digidyne, 734 F.2d at 1336; CalComp, 613 F.2d at 727.
3. See Digidyne, 734 F.2d at 1336; CalComp, 613 F.2d at 727.
4. 504 U.S. 451 (1992).
5. 7 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) 50,141 (1994).
6. 36 F.3d 1147 (1st Cir. 1994).
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nance service from Data General, or those intending to service their
own equipment (and therefore not intending to purchase service from
other providers, such as Grumman).7 In rejecting Grumman's coun-
terclaims, the court largely failed to examine the market conditions
and economic effects of the practices.
In contrast, Digidyne, Kodak, and the DOJ Guidelines recog-
nized that the realities of the computer marketplace often constrain
consumers' freedom to choose alternative service and downstream
providers because expensive hardware purchases "lock in" customers,
limiting their reasonable choices.8 This article proceeds with an over-
view of the antitrust principles involved in the recent cases, a discus-
sion of Digidyne, Kodak, and the DOJ Guidelines, and highlights
issues that remain unresolved by a review of Grumman III.
I
Antitrust Principles
The principal antitrust allegations against computer marketing
practices have been based on either tying arrangements, which violate
both section 1 of the Sherman Act and section 3 of the Clayton Act, or
monopolization, which violates section 2 of the Sherman Act.
A. Tying Arrangements
1. In General
A "tying arrangement is the sale of one separate and distinct
product (the 'tying product') on the condition that the buyer also
purchase from the seller a second product (the 'tied product')."9 Tie-
ins are per se unlawful if: (i) the seller has "appreciable economic
power" in the market for the tying product; and (ii) a significant
amount of interstate commerce is affected.' ° Some of the classic ex-
amples of tying arrangements are:
(1) A company offers its tabulating card machines on the condition
that customers use only that company's tabulating cards in the
machines.1'(2) A company leases salt machines to customers on the condition
that the lessees use only that company's salt products with
them.' 2
7. Id. at 1179.
8. Kodak, 504 U.S. at 476.
9. Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5-6 (1958).
10. Kodak, 504 U.S. at 462; Northern Pac. Ry., 356 U.S. at 6.
11. International Business Machs. Corp. v. United States, 298 U.S. 131 (1936).
12. International Salt Co. v. United States, 332 U.S. 392 (1947).
(3) A railroad offers to sell land to farmers on the condition that
the farmers ship products from the land only on the company's
railroad unless competitive carriers offer better rates.13
(4) A movie company offers its popular movies to theaters only on
the condition that they also lease less popular movies. 14
Historically, courts have treated the tying arrangements as a per
se offense.' 5 If, however, a plaintiff cannot show economic power in
the tying product market, the "rule of reason" will apply and the eco-
nomic effects of the tie will determine liability.' 6 As a result, the de-
bate over tying has centered on whether a given practice is to be
condemned as per se illegal. In Jefferson Parish Hospital District No. 2
v. Hyde, 7 a five-member majority of the Court declined to abandon
per se treatment of tying arrangements. The minority, however, was
persuaded by a persistent attack on the "per se" rule which the Chi-
cago school of economists had developed.' 8
2. Separate Products
A tying arrangement must involve a "tying" product accompa-
nied by a separate "tied" product. The existence of a tying arrange-
ment can be factually difficult to prove and is often contested. The
cases suggest at least seven relevant factors in determining the exist-
ence of a tying arrangement:
(1) Do other companies sell the products separately?
(2) Is the package sold always the same or does it vary with each
purchaser?
(3) Are the products always sold in the same proportion or are they
sold in varying proportions?
(4) Is the customer charged separately for the tied and tying
products?
(5) Does the defendant sell the tied product without the tying
product?
(6) Does the requirement of the package purchase result in special
cost savings apart from those normally attendant upon the forced
sale of a tied product?
13. Northern Pac. Ry., 356 U.S. at 1.
14. United States v. Loew's, Inc., 371 U.S. 38 (1962).
15. See, e.g., id. at 45; Northern Pac. Ry., 356 U.S. at 6.
16. Fortner Enters., Inc. v. United States Steel Corp., 394 U.S. 495, 500 (1969) ("Fort-
ner/").
17. 466 U.S. 2 (1984).
18. See Ward S. Bowman, Jr., Tying Arrangements and the Leverage Problem, 67 YALE
L.J. 19 (1957); RICHARD A. POSNER, ANrnRusT LAW: AN ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVE 173-
80 (1976); but cf Jack E. Brown & F. M. Scherer, The Value of Patents and Other Legally
Protected Commercial Rights: Panel Discussion, 53 ANTITRUST L.J. 535 (1984).
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(7) Does the defendant manufacture both the tying and tied
products? 19
3. Economic Power
A showing that the defendant maintains monopoly power or has
a dominant position in the market for the tying product satisfies the
economic power requirement. E° Courts have also held that a patent
or copyright in the tying product raises the presumption that the
holder has sufficient economic power to satisfy the Sherman Act's,
and, by implication, the Clayton Act's, requirement.21 Finally, the
courts infer economic power where consumers have no independent
reason to enter the tying arrangement,2 E or where unique products
exist.23
The Jefferson Parish Court attempted to harmonize the various
approaches to proving economic power by stating that common to
each is "the seller's exploitation of its control over the tying product
to force the buyer into the purchase of a tied product that the buyer
either did not want at all, or might have preferred to purchase else-
where on different terms., 24
19. See Jefferson Parish, 466 U.S. at 22 n.35 (approving the above approach to separate
product analysis implemented in leading cases, including Moore v. Jas. H. Matthews & Co.,
550 F.2d 1207, 1214-15 (9th Cir. 1977), and In re Data Gen. Corp. Antitrust Litig., 490 F.
Supp. 1089, 1104-10 (N.D. Cal. 1980), affd sub nom. Digidyne Corp. v. Data General
Corp., 734 F.2d 1336, 1339-41 (9th Cir. 1984)).
20. See United Shoe Mach. Corp. v. United States, 258 U.S. 451, 457-58 (1922)
("When it is considered that the United Company occupies a dominating position in sup-
plying shoe machinery of the classes involved, these covenants, signed by the lessee and
binding upon him, effectually prevent him from acquiring the machinery of a competitor of
the lessor, except at the risk of forfeiting the right to use the machines furnished by the
United Company, which may be absolutely essential to the prosecution and success of his
business."); International Business Machs. Corp. v. United States, 298 U.S. 131, 133 (1936)
(IBM was the larger of the only two competitors in the market for tabulating card ma-
chines); Jerrold Elecs. Corp. v. Westcoast Broadcasting Co., 341 F.2d 653, 661 (9th Cir.
1965) ("Jerrold, as we have noted, had a dominant position in the business in which it was
engaged in the marketing of community television antenna systems, the relevant market
here."), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 817 (1965).
21. United States v. Loew's, Inc., 371 U.S. 30, 45-46 (1962) ("The requisite economic
power is presumed when the tying product is patented or copyrighted.").
22. See Northern Pacific Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 7-8 (1958) ("The very exist-
ence of this host of tying arrangements is itself compelling evidence of the defendant's
great power, at least where, as here, no other explanation has been offered for the exist-
ence of these restraints.").
23. Fortner Enters., Inc. v. United States Steel Corp., 394 U.S. 495, 503 (1969) ("The
crucial economic power may be inferred from the tying product's desirability to consumers
or from uniqueness in its attributes.") (quoting Loew's, 371 U.S. at 45).
24. Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 12 (1984).
B. Monopolization
Monopolization requires "(1) the possession of monopoly power
in the relevant market and (2) the willful acquisition or maintenance
of that power as distinguished from growth or development as a con-
sequence of a superior product, business acumen, or historic acci-
dent.""5 A "relevant market" has two distinct components: a relevant
product market and a relevant geographic market.2 6
The threshold issue in a monopolization case is defining the rele-
vant market. 7 Typically, defendants attempt to define the market as
broadly as possible to minimize their market share and thereby fore-
close a finding of monopoly power. Such an attempt, however, is sub-
ject to the requirement that the market be limited to "products that
are 'reasonably interchangeable,' and so can be said to compete with
each other for the same buyers' dollars. '28
The difficulty of applying market analysis to the computer indus-
try is well illustrated by the series of antitrust cases filed against IBM
in the 1970s. While each case was based on essentially the same con-
duct on the part of IBM, the market analyses differed substantially, as
did the conclusions that were based on those analyses (IBM prevailed
in four of the five cases).29 The market definitions ranged from very
narrow (plug-compatible peripherals 30 and the leasing of general-pur-
pose systems) 31 to very broad (general-purpose computer systems).3 2
Greyhound, CalComp, and Transamerica held that IBM possessed
monopoly power, although only in Greyhound was sufficient evidence
25. United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 570-71 (1966) (emphasis added);
Oahu Gas Serv., Inc. v. Pacific Resources Inc., 838 F.2d 360, 363 (9th Cir. 1988) (quoting
the Grinnell elements), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 870 (1988).
26. Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 324 (1962); Los Angeles Memorial
Coliseum Comm'n v. National Football League, 726 F.2d 1381, 1392 (9th Cir. 1984), cert.
denied, 469 U.S. 990 (1984).
27. See United States v. E. I. du Pont De Nemours & Co., 353 U.S. 586, 593 (1957).
28. See General Business Sys. v. North Am. Philips Corp., 699 F.2d 965, 972 (9th Cir.
1983).
29. See California Computer Prods. v. International Business Machs. Corp., 613 F.2d
727 (9th Cir. 1979); Greyhound Computer Corp., Inc. v. International Business Machs.
Corp., 559 F.2d 488 (9th Cir. 1977) (Greyhound), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1040 (1978); In re
IBM Peripheral EDP Devices Antitrust Litig., 481 F. Supp. 965 (N.D. Cal. 1979), affd sub
nom Transamerica Computer Co., Inc. v. International Business Machs. Corp., 698 F.2d
1377 (9th Cir. 1983) (Transamerica), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 955 (1983); Telex Corp. v. Inter-
national Business Machs. Corp., 510 F.2d 894 (10th Cir. 1975) ("Telex"), cert. dismissed,
423 U.S. 802 (1975).
30. CalComp, 613 F.2d at 727.
31. Greyhound, 559 F.2d at 494.
32. See In re IBM Peripheral EDP Devices, 481 F. Supp. at 965; Transamerica, 698
F.2d at 1377; Telex, 510 F.2d at 894.
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found to support an antitrust violation.33 In two cases, the courts de-
termined that IBM did not possess monopoly power.
34
1. Predatory conduct
Proving that a defendant has obtained monopoly power, how-
ever, does not alone establish a Sherman Act, section 2 monopoliza-
tion violation. A plaintiff also must prove that the defendant engaged
in predatory or anti-competitive conduct that contributed to the de-
fendant's market dominance. 35 Examples of predatory conduct are:
(1) A ski facility operator refuses to continue a joint marketing ef-
fort with a competitor.
36
(2) A pharmaceutical manufacturer mails a false and misleading
letter to pharmacists intending to intimidate the pharmacists into
only dispensing the manufacturer's brand name drug for certain
conditions.37
(3) A manufacturer of driving simulator equipment bribes public
officials, files lawsuits against purchasers when it loses a bid and
consistently disparages its competitor's product to potential
customers.
(4) A durable medical equipment supplier and a hospital engage in
various marketing strategies and kickback schemes designed to pre-
vent a competitor from gaining access to hospital's patients.39
2. Willfulness
A plaintiff also must establish that the defendant willfully ob-
tained or maintained its monopoly power.4 ° Willfulness is established
through evidence of predatory or anti-competitive conduct and a
33. Greyhound, 434 U.S. at 1040.
34. Telex, 510 F.2d at 894; ILC Peripherals Leasing Corp. v. International Business
Machs. Corp., 458 F. Supp. 423, 431 (N.D. Cal. 1978).
35. Cf Twin City Sportservice, Inc. v. Charles 0. Finley & Co., 512 F.2d 1264, 1270
(9th Cir. 1975) (monopoly power obtained or maintained as a result of a superior product,
business acumen or historic accident is not unlawful), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1009 (1982).
36. Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 472 U.S. 585 (1985).
37. National Ass'n of Pharmaceutical Mfrs., Inc. v. Ayerst Labs., 850 F.2d 904 (2d Cir.
1988).
38. Instructional Sys. Dev. Corp. v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 817 F.2d 639 (10th Cir.
1987).
39. Advanced Health-Care Servs. v. Radford Community Hosp., 910 F.2d 139 (4th
Cir. 1990).
40. See, e.g., Image Technical Servs., Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 903 F.2d 612, 620 (9th
Cir. 1990) (reversing summary judgment because "a reasonable trier of fact could find that
Kodak's implementation of its policies [refusal to sell products to service organizations and
refusal to sell parts to Kodak equipment owners unless they agreed not to use service
organizations] was anti-competitive, exclusionary, and involved a specific intent to monop-
olize."), affd in pertinent part, 504 U.S. 451 (1992).
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showing of general intent to monopolize, which in turn can be estab-
lished by conduct.41
II
Digidyne, Kodak, and the DOJ Guidelines
With the foregoing tying and monopolization principles in mind,
this article now turns to consider their recent application to the com-
puter field.
A. Digidyne v. Data General
If a company introduces a new computer that does not run ex-
isting operating system software, the computer manufacturer may be
obliged to create such software and offer it with the computer. Be-
cause software and hardware are used together, it may make eco-
nomic sense to market them together. This does not mean, however,
that an operating system and the hardware constitute a single product
or that a tie-in (i.e., forced sale) of the two together is permissible.42
In Digidyne, defendant Data General manufactured a computer
system known as NOVA. The NOVA system consisted of two compo-
nents: (i) a NOVA Central Processing Unit (CPU) designed to per-
form a particular "instruction set;" and (ii) a copyrighted NOVA
operating system known as RDOS, which contained the basic com-
mands for operation of the NOVA system.43 Data General licensed
RDOS only to purchasers of the NOVA CPU.44 Digidyne and
Fairchild Camera & Instrument Corp. sued, alleging that such conduct
constituted an unlawful tying arrangement, thereby violating section 1
of the Sherman Act and section 3 of the Clayton Act.
The district court denied the parties' cross-motions for summary
judgment, though it found a number of facts to be uncontroverted,
and conducted a jury trial limited to the issue of Data General's eco-
nomic power.45 The jury found for the plaintiffs (i.e., Data General
possessed sufficient economic power to warrant a finding of unlawful
tying), but the district court granted Data General's motion for judg-
41. Id.
42. See In re Data Gen. Corp. Antitrust Litigation, 490 F. Supp. 1089, 1120-23 (N.D.
Cal. 1980), affd sub nom. Digidyne Corp. v. Data Gen. Corp., 734 F.2d 1336, 1338-39 (9th
Cir. 1984) (rejecting proffered justifications).
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ment notwithstanding the verdict or a new trial.46 The plaintiffs
appealed.
The Ninth Circuit began its analysis by outlining the require-
ments for finding a tying arrangement illegal per se, explaining that
once such a finding is made the court will not inquire further as to
whether competition is unreasonably restrained in fact.47 The Ninth
Circuit held that the district court erred in setting aside the jury's find-
ing and by requiring proof of "power to fix the price of the tying prod-
uct in the whole of the relevant market."48 The court held that, even
absent a showing of market dominance, the requisite market power
may be "inferred from the tying product's desirability to consumers or
from uniqueness in its attributes."49
More specifically, the court found that Data General possessed,
and had exercised, power over price in the classical sense by exploit-
ing its established repeat customers who were locked into the contin-
ued use of its operating system software." The proof included not
only Data General's own pricing documents and sales data, but also
analysis of Data General's unique Minimum Equipment Configura-
tion (MEC) requirement. The MEC required, as a condition to every
software license, that the licensee acquire from Data General not only
a central processing unit manufactured by Data General, but also a
specified minimum amount of other hardware, or risk paying an addi-
tional license fee which was viewed as a "fine" or "penalty."'" As a
result, customers purchased items of inferior quality at inflated prices
which they would have preferred to purchase from others or, in some
instances, for which they had no use and immediately discarded.5 2
The court also concluded that it was impossible for a competitor
to create software in a timely fashion that could be substituted for
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 1339 (citing United States v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377
(1958)).
49. Id. at 1340 (quoting United States v. Loew's, Inc., 371 U.S. 38, 45 (1962)); see also
Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 14 n.20 (1984) (holding that power
over the whole market is not required, only a "type of market power [that] has sometimes
been referred to as 'leverage ... defined here as a supplier's ability to induce his customers
for one product to buy a second product from him that would not otherwise be purchased
solely on the merit of that second product."' (quoting P. AREEDA AND D. TURNER, ANTI-
TRUST LAW 1134a, at 202 (1980))); Fortner Enters., Inc. v. United States Steel Corp., 394
U.S. 495, 502-03 (1969) (holding that "the economic power over the tying product can be
sufficient even though the power falls far short of dominance and even though the power
exists only with respect to some of the buyers in the market.").
50. Digidyne, 734 F.2d at 1342-43.
51. Id. at 1343.
52. Id.
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Data General software (compatible software). 53 This conclusion con-
trasts sharply with the facts in other cases.54
Finally, the court held that no requirement existed, as the district
court had suggested, that the restraint on competition be "substantial"
within the entire market for the tied product (here, the NOVA
CPU).55 A plaintiff need establish only that a substantial volume of
commerce is foreclosed, which is defined as "substantial enough in
terms of dollar-volume so as not to be merely de minimis."5 6
A lawyer representing Data General during the trial later com-
mented that the decision had "widespread implications for the mar-
keting of computer products." 57 Another commentator has declared
that the decision sends "a clear message to computer manufacturers:
software may not be licensed on the condition that customers also
purchase hardware from the manufacturers."5 8 Indeed, the Digidyne
decision has been the subject of much commentary.59
B. Eastman Kodak v. Image Technical Services
In 1992, the Supreme Court largely approved the analysis in
Digidyne.6 ° In Kodak, the Court held that the existence of competi-
tion in a primary equipment market does not preclude, as a matter of
law, a finding of market or monopoly power in derivative
aftermarkets. 61 Specifically, the Court held that an equipment manu-
facturer that does not have market power in the equipment market
53. Id. at 1342.
54. See Apple Computer, Inc. v. Formula Int'l Inc., 725 F.2d 521, 525 (9th Cir. 1984)
("Apple introduced evidence that numerous methods exist for writing the programs in-
volved here ....").
55. Digidyne, 734 F.2d at 1341.
56. Id. (citing Fortner Enters., Inc. v. United States Steel Corp., 394 U.S. 495, 501
(1969)).
57. Ronald L. Johnston, Product Bundling Faces Increased Specter of Illegality Under
the Antitrust Laws, COMPUTER LAW., Sept. 1984, at 1.
58. Gary L. Reback, Further Reflections on Data General and the Law of Pricing Un-
bundled Products, COMPUTER LAW., Nov. 1984, at 1.
59. See, e.g., John F. Dienelt and Gail M.G. Foote, Tying and Franchising: A Question
of Perspective, 6 WTR FRANCHISE L.J. 1 (1987); Payton Smith, Exclusive Dealing and Tie-
Ins, in 26TH ANNUAL ADVANCED ANTITRUST SEMINAR: DISTRIBUTION AND MARKETING
(PLI Corp. Law and Practice Course Handbook Series No. 546, 1986); Gary Myers, Tying
Arrangements and the Computer Industry: Digidyne Corp. v. Data General Corp., 1985
DUKE L.J. 1027 (1985); Marlis McAllister, Digidyne Corporation v. Data General Corpora-
tion: Market Power and Software Copyright, 15 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 65 (1985);
Roger C. Bern, Jefferson Parish Hospital District No. 2 v. Hyde: Return to Reality in Eco-
nomic Power Analysis in Tying Cases, 53 Mo. L. REV. 145 (1985); D. Cellini, Developments
in the Law, 1983-1984: Antitrust, 45 LA. L. REV. 199 (1984).
60. Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Servs., Inc., 504 U.S. 451 (1992).
61. Id. at 470-71.
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can still hold such power in derivative aftermarkets, such as parts and
service, that may consist of a single product of a single manufacturer.62
Kodak, a manufacturer of photocopiers and micrographic
software, also sold service and replacement parts for its equipment.
63
Kodak parts were not compatible with competitors' machines.64 In
1985, Kodak limited sales of its replacement parts to owners of Kodak
equipment that either repaired their own machines or purchased Ko-
dak service.65 Unable to obtain parts for the machines they serviced,
many independent service organizations (ISOs) went out of business
or lost substantial revenues.66
In 1987, eighteen ISOs that serviced and repaired Kodak ma-
chines67 sued Kodak alleging that Kodak had: (i) unlawfully tied the
sale of service for Kodak machines to the sale of parts, and (ii) unlaw-
fully monopolized and attempted to monopolize the market to service
Kodak machines.68
1. Tying
The Court held that a rational trier of fact could find replacement
parts and product service to be distinct markets. The Court based its
holding on evidence that suggested the existence of independent de-
mand for the two items.69 Thus, while Kodak lacked substantial mar-
ket share in the equipment market,70 the Court rejected its contention
that a lack of market power in the upstream equipment market pre-
cluded market power in the downstream markets for parts and ser-
vice.7 1 Kodak maintained that monopoly profits in the service and
parts markets could not exist absent an equipment monopoly because
consumers would purchase other brands of equipment with lower
maintenance costs.
72
The Supreme Court disagreed with Kodak's position and held
that, as a result of "significant information and switching costs, 71 3 the
elasticity of demand (i.e., the rate at which the higher costs of service
and parts will cause purchasers to switch to another brand of equip-
62. Id. at 481-82.
63. Id. at 457.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 458.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 455.
68. Id. at 459.
69. Id. at 462-63.
70. Id. at 465-66 n.10.
71. Id. at 471.
72. Id. at 466.
73. Id. at 473.
ment) did not justify Kodak's actions and that Kodak indeed could
have market power in the downstream market for parts.74 The Court
found that most consumers would be unable to assess the total cost of
the equipment plus repairs "package" at the time of purchase.75
Moreover, as in Digidyne, the Court found that the cost of switching
to another brand as a result of increased service costs may effectively
"lock-in" those who have already purchased Kodak equipment.76 By
focusing on market realities, the Court rejected Kodak's economic
analysis, which depended on whether the equipment market per-




The Court held that Kodak's control of nearly 100 percent of the
parts market and eighty percent to ninety-five percent of the service
market was sufficient evidence of monopoly power to survive sum-
mary judgment.78
Kodak's major contention in the Sherman Act, section 2 claim
was that it did not have monopoly power in the "relevant market"
because the products and services in question were "Kodak" and a
single brand can never be a relevant market under the Sherman Act.
7 9
The Court disagreed and held that, because service and replacement
parts for Kodak equipment are not interchangeable with other manu-
facturers' service and parts, the relevant market to a Kodak equip-
ment owner includes only those companies that service Kodak
machines. 80
Image Technical Services alleged the following predatory con-
duct: (1) in 1985 and 1986, Kodak implemented a policy of selling
replacement parts for micrographic and copying machines only to
buyers of Kodak equipment that used Kodak service or repaired their
own machines; (2) Kodak and its parts manufacturers agreed that the
parts manufacturers would not sell parts that fit Kodak equipment to
anyone other than Kodak; (3) Kodak pressured Kodak equipment
74. Id. at 477.
75. Id. at 473 ("In order to arrive at an accurate price, a consumer must acquire a
substantial amount of raw data and undertake sophisticated analysis.").
76. Id. at 476 ("If the cost of switching is high, consumers who already have purchased
the equipment are thus 'locked in,' and will tolerate some level of service-price increases
before changing equipment brands.").
77. Id. at 472-73.
78. Id. at 481.
79. Id. at 481-82.
80. Id.
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owners and independent parts distributors not to sell Kodak parts to
ISOs; and (4) Kodak took steps to restrict the availability of used ma-
chines."' The Court also found that factual questions existed as to
whether Kodak's "business reasons" for its actions were valid.82
C. The DOJ Guidelines
The DOJ Guidelines,83 which are intended to supplant Part II of
the 1988 Antitrust Enforcement Guidelines for International Opera-
tions,84 examine the role of copyrights, patents, and trade secrets in
traditional antitrust analysis.85
The Guidelines adopt three fundamental principles: (i) "the De-
partment regards intellectual property as being essentially comparable
to any other form of property," (ii) "the Department does not pre-
sume that intellectual property creates market power in the antitrust
context," and (iii) "the Department recognizes that intellectual prop-
erty licensing allows firms to combine complementary factors of pro-
duction and is generally pro-competitive.18 6
With respect to the types of practices challenged in Digidyne, Ko-
dak, and Grumman III, the Guidelines cite as antitrust activity that
conduct which conditions "the ability of a customer to license one or
more items of intellectual property on the customer's purchase of an-
other item of intellectual property or a good or service" where effi-
ciency justifications do not outweigh the adverse effect on competition
in the market for the tied product.s7
III
Grumman v. Data General
In Grumman III, Data General alleged copyright infringement
and trade secret misappropriations against Grumman, who counter-
claimed based on tying and monopolization antitrust violations.88
81. Id. at 464.
82. Id. at 483-84.
83. 7 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) 50,141 (1994).
84. 4 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) 13,109 (1988).
85. The Guidelines also state the antitrust Division's enforcement policy with respect
to mask works fixed in a semiconductor chip product. 7 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) $1 49,064.
86. Id. ("As with other forms of private property, certain acquisitions of intellectual
property, and certain types of agreements with respect to such property, have anti-compet-
itive effects against which the antitrust laws can and do protect. Intellectual property is
thus neither particularly free-from [sic] scrutiny under the antitrust laws, nor particularly
suspect under them.").
87. Id. 49,073.
88. Data Gen. Corp. v. Grumman Sys. Support Corp., 36 F.3d 1147, 1152 (1st Cir.
1994).
19951
Data General and Grumman competed in the maintenance and repair
of computers manufactured by Data General.89 While Data General
held only a 5% market share in the "primary market" for mini-com-
puters, it controlled 90% of the "aftermarket" for service of Data
General computers. 9° Grumman, a defense contractor with a third
party maintenance subsidiary (TPM), competed with Data General
only in the service aftermarket. 91
Until 1985, Data General promoted the growth and development
of TPMs, including Grumman, by selling or licensing to them its diag-
nostic software, schematics (blueprints of equipment that often con-
tained manufacturing secrets), engineering change orders, upgrades
and updates, and spare parts.92 Moreover, Data General opened its
training classes to TPM field engineers, including those from
Grumman.93
In the mid-1980s, however, Data General limited TPMs' access to
its various services in order to maximize revenues from its service
business. 94 For example, Data General prohibited TPMs from using
Data General's repair depot, and would not allow the purchase of
schematics, documentation, "change order" kits, or certain spare
parts. 95 Moreover, Data General no longer allowed TPM technicians
to attend its training classes.96 Finally, Data General developed and
severely restricted the licensing of MV Advanced Diagnostic Execu-
tive System (MV/ADEX), a software diagnostic used to repair and
maintain Data General's MV computers.97
While a number of the service tools made unavailable to TPMs
directly from Data General were available to all equipment owners
(even customers of TPMs) and evidence existed that TPMs could
purchase at least some spare parts from other sources, Data General
more severely restricted access to MV/ADEX.98 Data General per-
mitted its service technicians to use MV/ADEX to perform service or
repair for Data General equipment owners and offered to license MV/
ADEX to its equipment owners that performed service in-house. 99










98. Id. at 1154.
99. Id.
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vice customers or to TPMs. 1 ° In addition, MV/ADEX was unavaila-
ble to TPMs from any source other than Data General. 0 1
When Data General became aware that Grumman service per-
sonnel had obtained and were using copies of MV/ADEX for the
maintenance and repair of Data General computers, 102 Data General
filed an action against Grumman alleging copyright infringement and
trade secret misappropriation. Grumman asserted antitrust-based de-
fenses and counterclaims based on tying and monopolization.
The district court granted Data General's motion for summary
judgment on Grumman's antitrust counterclaims.1 0 3 With respect to
its monopolization claim, Grumman alleged that Data General had
monopolized the market for service of Data General computers, an
aftermarket similar to that upheld in Kodak.104
With respect to exclusionary conduct, Grumman pointed to the
following Data General practices: (i) cessation of its pre-1985 offering
to Grumman of software diagnostics, schematics, engineering change
orders, upgrades, and updates; (ii) commencement of and denial to
Grumman of membership in the Cooperative Maintenance Organiza-
tion (CMO) program, which offered MV/ADEX licenses but was lim-
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Id. at 1154-55. The court detailed Grumman's means of obtaining access to MV/
ADEX:
Some former DG employees, in violation of their employment agreements,
brought copies of ADEX when they joined Grumman. In addition, DG field
engineers often stored copies of ADEX at the work sites of their service custom-
ers, who were bound to preserve the confidentiality of any DG proprietary infor-
mation in their possession. Although DG service customers had an obligation to
return copies of ADEX to DG should they cancel their service agreement and
switch to a TPM, few customers did so. It is essentially undisputed that Grum-
man technicians used and duplicated copies of ADEX left behind by DG field
engineers. There is also uncontroverted evidence that Grumman actually ac-
quired copies of ADEX in this matter in order to maintain libraries of diagnostics
so that Grumman technicians could freely duplicate and use any copy of ADEX
to service any of Grumman's customers with DG's MV computers.
Id.
103. Data General Corp. v. Grumman Sys. Support Corp., 825 F. Supp. 340 (D. Mass.
1993) ("Grumman II'), affirmed in part and remanded, 36 F.3d 1147 (1st Cir. 1994).
104. Data Gen. Corp. v. Grumman Sys. Support Corp., 761 F. Supp. 185, 188 (D. Mass.
1991) ("Grumman r') (granting in part Data General's motion to dismiss Grumman's anti-
trust counterclaims). While Data General contended that vigorous competition among
computer systems manufacturers, competitors in the "upstream" market, would constrain
its ability to charge monopoly prices for computer service, the trial court denied summary
judgment based on product market definition, finding that Grumman's proffered expert
testimony regarding purchasers' ability to assess maintenance costs at the time of purchase,
their relative price sensitivity, and the "lock in" established by the high cost of switching
systems to avoid payment of a monopoly price for service created genuine issues of mate-
rial fact regarding market definition. Id.
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ited to owners of Data General computers who were capable of self-
maintenance and were not TPMs; (iii) refusal to permit TPMs access
to CMO training classes, repair of parts, sale of spare parts or engi-
neering change orders, upgrades, updates, and schematics; (iv) refusal
to license MV/ADEX except to CMOs; and (v) "illegal and unscrupu-
lous" acts to regain customers lost to TPMs. 10 5
Concluding that the referenced conduct was not exclusionary, the
district court dismissed the monopolization claim. Grumman argued
that Data General's conduct was predatory under Aspen Skiing,10 6
which found exclusionary conduct based on a monopolistic change in
policy that injured competitors' businesses. While the district court
found a similarity between the two cases based on "the issue of prior
promotion of competition in a market that is later halted," the court
found Aspen Skiing inapposite because Grumman was free to develop
its own diagnostic software and Data General's services, other than
MV/ADEX, were available to ultimate consumers, even if they dealt
with TPMs. 10 7
Grumman's tying claim was based on narrower facts-it alleged
that Data General refused to license MV/ADEX except to CMOs that
performed maintenance in-house and were not independent service
providers. 10 8 Thus, the alleged tie consisted of forcing Data General
equipment owners to purchase Data General service to obtain MV/
ADEX, the tying product.10 9 Holding that Data General did not con-
dition the availability of MV/ADEX on the use of Data General ser-
vice, the court granted summary judgment in Data General's favor.110
In so ruling, the district court adopted the reasoning of a similar
case that Data General had filed.1 ' In Service & Training, the district
court granted summary judgment dismissing Service & Training's ty-
ing claim, which alleged that owners of Data General computers were
required to purchase Data General computer maintenance and repair
services to obtain access to MV/ADEX. 112 In so ruling, the district
court in Service & Training held that access to MV/ADEX services (in
105. Id. at 189.
106. Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 472 U.S. 585 (1985).
107. Grumman 1, 761 F. Supp. at 190-91.
108. Id. at 192-93. The court recognized that Data General hardware owners could
obtain access to, but not a license to use, MV/ADEX by purchasing repair services from
Data General.
109. Data Gen. Corp. v. Grumman Sys. Support Corp., 834 F. Supp. 477, 484 (D. Mass.
1992).
110. Id. at 485.
11l. Service & Training, Inc. v. Data Gen. Corp., 963 F.2d 680 (4th Cir. 1992).
112. Service & Training, Inc. v. Data Gen. Corp., 737 F. Supp. 334, 342-43 (D. Md.
1990), affd on other grounds, 963 F.2d 680 (4th Cir. 1992).
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contrast to a license to use MV/ADEX) was not a distinct product
from the purportedly tied product, the provision of maintenance and
repair services for Data General computers." 3 The court distin-
guished access to MV/ADEX from a license for the software which,
the court reasoned, would constitute a separate and distinct prod-
uct.114 Thus, if Data General had offered MV/ADEX licenses to own-
ers of its computers on the condition that they purchase Data General
service, two products susceptible to tying would have existed.
The Fourth Circuit reviewed Service & Training and affirmed the
grant of summary judgment, but disagreed with the trial court's sepa-
rate product analysis. It characterized Service & Training's tying alle-
gation-a "refusal to sell or license MV/ADEX to all customers,
including TPMs, and [the] decision to require customers who want ac-
cess to MV/ADEX to purchase support services from [Data Gen-
eral]"-as defining the tying product as MV/ADEX licensing rights,
as opposed to access to MV/ADEX." 5 While allowing that mere ac-
cess to MV/ADEX repair services is not a separate product from Data
General maintenance and repair services, the court interpreted Ser-
vice & Training's allegations as meeting the requirement of separate
products."16
Despite the holding, the Fourth Circuit affirmed on the ground
that Service & Training had not established the existence of a tying
arrangement in relation to the relevant products." 7 Because Data
General did not license MV/ADEX to equipment owners other than
CMOs, the court found no facts to justify finding a tying arrangement
between Data General and its non-CMO customers. 1 8 With respect
to CMOs, the court found that Service & Training had failed to estab-
lish that the licenses were conditioned either on an agreement: (1) not
to purchase repair services from independent repair providers, or (2)
to purchase Data General maintenance and repair services." 9 Citing
Data General's CMO agreements, the court found that, by definition,
CMOs repair their own computers and do not purchase repair serv-
ices, establishing that CMOs were not forced to select Data General
113. Id. at 343.
114. Id.
115. Service & Training, 963 F.2d at 683.
116. Id. at 683, 685 n.9. The court applied the "character of demand" test set forth in
Jefferson Parish. In Jefferson Parish, the Court examined the alleged products from the
vantage of consumer demand to determine whether independent demand existed for each.
Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 21-22 (1984).
117. Service & Training, 963 F.2d at 685-88.
118. Id. at 686-87.
119. Id. at 686.
maintenance and repair. 120 The court, however, declined to infer from
the contract a so-called "negative tie" between MV/ADEX licenses
and a refusal to purchase services from TPMs-despite the fact that,
by definition, CMOs did not purchase repair services. 21
The court thus construed the CMO agreement as a unilateral de-
cision to license only a certain class of customers-those that per-
formed self-maintenance-rather than an agreement that such
licensees not purchase third-party service. In doing so, the Fourth Cir-
cuit explicitly rejected the Ninth Circuit opinion in Kodak. That court
found that similar agreements, under which Kodak agreed to sell parts
only to equipment owners who serviced their own copiers, constituted
tying.1 22 The Grumman trial court adopted its reasoning despite the
Supreme Court's opinion affirming the Ninth Circuit's Kodak ruling.
The Grumman trial court reasoned that the evidence of a negative
tying agreement in Kodak was stronger than the evidence in
Grumman.123
Following dismissal of Grumman's counterclaims and a trial on
Data General's copyright infringement and trade secrets misappropri-
ation claims, a jury awarded Data General $27,417,000. Grumman ap-
pealed the district court's rejection of its antitrust counterclaims. 24
The First Circuit affirmed summary judgment with respect to the
antitrust issues. The court recognized that Grumman had alleged two
distinct ties in its tying claim: (1) conditioning access to MV/ADEX
was contingent on the purchase of Data General service, and (2)
licenses for MV/ADEX were granted only to those equipment owners
who agreed not to purchase service from TPMs.125 The district court,
in contrast, had addressed only one tying product, MV/ADEX
licenses. With respect to the positive tie of MV/ADEX to Data Gen-
eral service, the court found separate products lacking. The court rea-
soned that Grumman had not shown that customers desire to
120. Id.
121. Id. at n.12 ("Thus, even if Data General's licensing agreements explicitly stated
that it would license MV/ADEX only to customers 'who service only their own ... equip-
ment,' we would not construe such a licensing limitation as evidence of an impermissible
tying arrangement. Provided it does so unilaterally, Data General may permissibly restrict
MV/ADEX licenses to a particular class of customers.").
122. Image Technical Servs., Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 903 F.2d 612, 621 (9th Cir.
1990).
123. Data Gen. Corp. v. Grumman Sys. Support Corp., 36 F.3d 1147, 1180-81 (1st Cir.
1994).
124. Id. at 1147.
125. Id. at 1179.
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purchase MV/ADEX service separately from other aspects of mainte-
nance and repair service. 12
6
Grumman produced sufficient facts to survive summary judgment
as to the status of MV/ADEX licenses and support service for Data
General computers as separate products.127 The court, however, af-
firmed the district court's conclusion that no tying agreement existed.
The agreement between Data General and CMOs provided: (1) the
program was designed for "customers who perform their own mainte-
nance," and (2) as a qualifying criterion, the customer .must
"[m]aintain[ ] systems which were purchased either for itself or for
resale to its customers."'1 28 Based on Data General's testimony that
CMOs are permitted to purchase Data General service on a "time and
materials" basis, the court reasoned that CMOs would be permitted to
purchase TPM service on that basis as well. 129 Significantly, Data
General conceded that CMOs, as MV/ADEX licensees, could not per-
mit TPMs to use their copies of MV/ADEX during maintenance and
repair.130 The court also found that Data General designed the CMO
program, in part, to prevent the loss of revenue to TPMs.131 Never-
theless, the First Circuit concluded that those facts constituted insuffi-
cient circumstantial evidence of an agreement. The court indicated an
alternative basis for dismissing the tying claim-the absence of direct
evidence of forcing (i.e., that CMOs unwillingly chose to maintain
their own computers).3 2
The Grumman court's disposition of the tying claim failed to give
credence to the practical effect of Data General's policy, which effec-
tively gave Data General equipment owners desiring MV/ADEX ser-
vice two choices: to purchase service from Data General, or to repair
and maintain their computers in-house. Thus, even if not in a strict
contractual sense, CMOs could not in reality purchase service from
TPMs. Given those facts, the court could have held a jury question
was presented as to the existence of a tying agreement. Such an anal-
ysis would be consistent with Digidyne and Kodak, which recommend
examination of market realities to determine the existence of eco-
nomic effects. 133
126. Id.
127. Id. at 1179-80.
128. Id. at 1180.
129. Id. at 1180-81.
130. Id. at 1181.
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Servs., Inc., 504 U.S. 451, 466-67 (1992)
("Legal presumptions that rest on formalistic distinctions rather than actual market reali-
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On the monopolization counterclaim, the court characterized the
totality of Data General's policy as a unilateral refusal to license MV/
ADEX to anyone other than CMOs.'34 The court found that the
copyright held by Data General provided a presumptively legitimate
business justification: the desire to exclude others from using the
copyrighted work. Based on that finding, the court held that Grum-
man had failed to satisfy the element of exclusionary conduct. 35 The
court applied a presumption that a refusal to license is not exclusion-
ary,136 despite recognizing that a monopolistic refusal to license may
violate the rule of reason. 137
The court held that Grumman had failed to overcome the pre-
sumption as a matter of law, and affirmed dismissal of the monopoli-
zation allegations. 138 Grumman argued that the case fell within the
Aspen Skiing definition of a monopolistic termination of assistance.
Curiously, the court rejected this argument by stating that "DG has
always been a monopolist.' 1 39 Other factors that weighed in Data
General's favor were that its copyright was acquired properly and the
court's finding that evidence existed that MV/ADEX development
benefitted Data General's customers. 4 °
Grumman alleged, however, that Data General, in addition to re-
fusing to license, also refused to sell spare parts, depot repair services,
documentation, change order kits, or schematics to TPMs. The court
also found these facts insufficient to raise an issue of exclusionary con-
duct. The court reasoned that in instances where the parts or services
ties are generally disfavored in antitrust law. This Court has preferred to resolve antitrust
claims on a case-by-case basis, focusing on the 'particular facts disclosed by the record"');
Digidyne Corp. v. Data Gen. Corp., 734 F.2d 1336, 1342 (9th Cir. 1984) (examining market
imperfections that magnified the economic effects of the tie). Notably, however, the appel-
late court relied upon an alternative holding to affirm dismissal of the negative tying claim.
The district court had recognized that Grumman presented some evidence that non-CMOs
who purchase Data General service would have preferred to deal with TPMs. Data Gen.
Corp. v. Grumman Sys. Support Corp., 761 F. Supp. 185, 193 (D. Mass. 1991). Because
CMO evidence of that nature was lacking, and given that only CMOs were permitted to
purchase the tying product, MV/ADEX licenses, the court affirmed summary judgment,
finding the evidence of forcing to be insufficient. Data Gen. Corp. v. Grumman Sys. Sup-
port Corp., 36 F.3d 1147, 1181 (1st Cir. 1994).
134. Data Gen. Corp., 36 F.3d at 1182.
135. Id. at 1187-88.
136. Id. at 1187 ("Drawing on our discussion above, we hold that while exclusionary
conduct can include a monopolist's unilateral refusal to license a copyright, an author's
desire to exclude others from use of its copyrighted work is a presumptively valid business
justification for any immediate harm to consumers.").
137. Id. at 1185.
138. Id. at 1188-89.
139. Id. at 1188.
140. Id. at 1188-89.
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were available to Data General's customers but not to TPMs, consum-
ers were not harmed because they could purchase the items from Data
General and have TPMs perform the labor.14 1 With respect to
schematics, which Data General made available to neither TPMs nor
their customers, the court found the conduct nonpredatory absent a
showing that Data General made changes in its equipment to prevent
technological advances by TPMs.142
In contrast to Kodak, which involved similar allegations of preda-
tory conduct, the Grumman court failed to take full account of the
extent and likely effects of the challenged Data General practices.
The court's ruling on monopolization, in particular, appears inconsis-




Despite Grumman's holding, recent developments in antitrust
law suggest that computer industry participants exercise caution when
seeking to expand their presence in service and other aftermarkets.
Even in cases where expansion in service and other aftermarkets in-
volves copyrighted software, discriminatory licensing and other argua-
bly exclusionary practices are the subject of frequent challenges.
Even so, antitrust liability has been imposed in a minority of cases.
141. Id. at 1189.
142. Id.

